If MikaTech was a bad company, you could find tons of bad reputations about its service on the internet over the 28 years history
So, the answer is YES! We are good people.Why choose Mikatech, please click here to find out
About MikaTech
Time went fast, from the day we did our first 8051 MCU reverse engineering project in 1998, to the day we set up our million dollar reverse engineering lab in 2012, 14 years went by. Now we start our new business of embedded visual system development, hope we can serve another 10 years.
Peter Lee
Co-Founder & CEO
SK Hynix Inc. (KRX: 000660) is a South Korean memory semiconductor supplier of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips and flash memory chips. Hynix is the world's second-largest memory chipmaker (after Samsung Electronics) and the world's sixth-largest semiconductor company. Founded as Hyundai Electronic Industrial Co., Ltd. in 1983[4] and known as Hyundai Electronics, the company has manufacturing sites in Korea, the US, China and Taiwan. In 2012, when SK Telecom became its major shareholder, Hynix merged to SK Group, the third largest conglomerate in South Korea. The company's shares are traded on the Korea Stock Exchange, and the Global Depository shares are listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
GMS81XX series mcu code receovery: GMS81004 GMS81008 GMS81016 GMS81024 GMS81032 GMS81504AT GMS81504T GMS81516 GMS81516AT GMS81516BT GMS81524 GMS81524AT GMS81524BT GMS81604T GMS81608T GMS81C5016 GMS81C5024 GMS81C5032 ...
GMS82XX series mcu code receovery: GMS82516T GMS82524T ...
GMS84XX series mcu code receovery: GMS84512T GMS84524T ...
GMS87XX series mcu code receovery: GMS87C1102 GMS87C1202 GMS87C1404 GMS87C1408 GMS87C2020 GMS87C5032 GMS87C5108 GMS87C7008 GMS87C7016 ...
GMS97XX series mcu code receovery: GMS97C1051 GMS97C2051 GMS97C51 GMS97C52 GMS97C54 GMS97C56 GMS97C58 GMS97L1051 GMS97L2051 GMS97L51 GMS97L52 GMS97L54 GMS97L56 GMS97L58 ...
GMS99XX series mcu code receovery: GMS99C51 GMS99C52 GMS99C58 ...
H26MXX series mcu code receovery: H26M11002AAR ...
H27UXX series mcu code receovery: H27U1G8F2BTR H27U4G8T2BTRB H27U518S2CTP H27UBG8U5MTR ...
H8ACXX series mcu code receovery: H8ACS0CE0ABR H8ACS0CF0ACR56 H8ACS0CF0MMR H8ACS0EH0ACR H8ACS0EJ0MCP H8ACS0PG0MBP H8ACS0PL0MCR H8ACS0SIOMBR H8ACUOCEOBBR H8ACUOCLOACR ...
H8BXXX series mcu code receovery: H8BCSOCEOABR56M H8BCSOCGOMBR H8BCSOCHOMMR H8BCS0PE0MBR H8BCSOPGOMBR H8BCS0QG0MBP H8BCS0RJOMCP H8BCS0SI0MBR H8BCS0SJ0MCP H8BCSOUN0MCR H8BES0SQOMCR ...
HMSXXX series mcu code receovery: HMS81004E HMS81008E HMS81016E HMS81020ET HMS81020TL HMS81024E HMS81032 HMS81032ET HMS81032T HMS81032TL HMS87C1102A HMS87C1104A HMS87C1202A HMS87C1204A HMS87C1302A HMS87C1304A HMS87C1404B HMS87C1408B HMS87C1416B HMS87C1508B HMS87C1516B HMS87C1608B HMS87C1616B HMS87C1708B MS87C1716B HMS87C1808B HMS87C1816B HMS87C5216 HMS99C51 HMS99C52 HMS99C58 ...
HY27XXX series mcu code receovery: HY2764 HY27C64A HY27SF081G2A HY27UA081G1M HY27UF081G2A HY27UF081G2M HY27UF082G2B HY27UF082G2M HY27UF084G2B HY27UF084G2M HY27UGO88G5B HY27UG088G5M HY27US08121A HY27US08121B HY27US08121M HY27US081G1M HY27US08281A HY27US08561A HY27US08561M HY27UT084G2A GY27UT084G2M HY27UT088G2A HY27U088G2M HY27UV08BG5M ...
HY29XXX series mcu code receovery: HY29DL162BF HY29DL162BT HY29DL162TF HY29DL162TT HY29DL163BF HY29DL163BT HY29DL163FT HY29DL163TT HY29DS162BF HY29DS162BT HY29DS162TT HY29DS162BF HY29DS162BT HY29DS162TF HY29DS162TT HY29DS163BF HY29DS163BT HY29DS163TF HY29DS163TT HY29F002T HY29F040 HY29F040A HY29F080 HY29F200B HY29F200T HY29F400ABG HY29F400ATG HY29F400ATT HY29F400BG HY29F400TG HY29F400TT HY29F800ABG HY29F800ABT HY29F800ATG HY29F800ATT HY29F800BG HY29F800BT HY29T800TG HY29F800TT HY29LV160BF HY29LV160BT HY29LV160TT HY29LV320BF HY29LV320TF HY29LV320TT HY29LV400BF HY29LV400BT HY29LV400TF HY29LV400TT HY29LV800BF HY29LV800BG HY29LV800BT HY29LV800TF HY29LV800TG HY29LV800TT ...
HY90XXX series mcu code receovery: HY90C46 HY93XXX series mcu code receovery: HY93C56 HY93C66 HY93C76 HY93C86 ...
HYC0XXX series mcu code receovery: HYC0SEEOMF1P HYC0SEF0MF3P HYC0SEH0AF3P HYC0SEH0MF3P HYC0SGH0MF3P HYC0UEE0AF2P HYC0UEE0MF2P HYC0UEF0MF3P HYC0UEL0MF3R ...
HYD0XXX series mcu code receovery: HYD0SEE0MF2P HYD0SFE0BF1P HYD0SFG0MF1 HYD0SQG0MF1P ...
HYG0XXX series mcu code receovery: HYG0SEG0MF2P HYG0SGH0MF3P HYG0SGJ0MF3P HYG0UEE0MF2P HYG0EG0MF2P HYG0UGH0MF3P HYG0UGH0MF3P ...
HYH0XXX series mcu code receovery: HYH0SQJ0MF3P HYH0SSJ0MF3P ...
HYI0XXX series mcu code receovery: HYI0SIJ0MF3P HYI0UIJ0MF3P ...
Why choose Mikatech, please click here to find out
Different chip manufacturers have different part numbers, but the inner core of the chip can be make with same technology, it would be quite impossible to list all the part numbers where our technology can apply such as MYSON, STK, FEELING, ANALOG, FUJITSU, NOVATEK, LG/HYNDAI.
Also by the advancing of the technology, everyday we gain more and more experience and develope new methods for reverse engineering for different Intergated Circuit parts. Full list of Integrated Circuit part numbers which is within our scope of capability is always getting bigger, please contact us to find out.
Mikatech Innovative Limited understands the importance of its clients' privacy. At the moment you contact Mikatech, the personal information from you will be put under protection by our management regulations which was developed by our years of practice, Mikatech uses these information to customize its service to you, it will never disclose these information to third party out of any reason.
Every project we did, we will delete all the data, materials, and codes 60days after deliverig the files, it iwll protect us and protect your privacy.
Yes, it is totally legal.
Mikatech deliver its reverse engineering services for educational purposes only, it can be illegal to use above mentioned services in some coutries or regions, please check your local laws.
Mikatech does not take any responsibility in relation to the use of above mentioned services that may be considered illegal.
The read-out protection mechanism represents the first line of defense for any microcontroller (MCU) manufacturer seeking to safeguard proprietary firmware from unauthorized extraction. When an engineer enables read-out protection on a production device, they typically assume that the firmware will remain secure against all but the most sophisticated adversaries. Unfortunately, this assumption has proven false time and again across numerous microcontroller families. The STM32 series, for instance, implements a Flash Readout Protection (RDP) mechanism designed to prevent access through the debug interface, yet researchers have uncovered critical vulnerabilities in this scheme. One such vulnerability, dubbed "RDP Freeze," enables an attacker to precisely capture the microcontroller's internal state—including registers and RAM—with cycle-level accuracy. This level of precision allows for firmware recovery through manipulation of the hardware CRC accelerator during execution, as well as cryptographic key extraction from running systems. The process of bypassing read-out protection typically begins with reconnaissance of the target MCU's debug interfaces. Many microcontrollers expose Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) or Serial Wire Debug (SWD) pins that, if left accessible, provide a direct pathway to dump flash contents. However, when read-out protection is properly enabled, these interfaces reject read requests and may even trigger an automatic erase of the flash memory upon detection of tampering attempts. This self-destruct feature is intended to prevent adversaries from extracting firmware through brute-force or repeated access attempts. Despite these safeguards, fault injection techniques have demonstrated remarkable success in bypassing read-out protection across diverse MCU architectures. The practical reality is that read-out protection offers only conditional security. An attacker with physical access to the device and appropriate equipment can often circumvent these protections through voltage glitching, clock manipulation, or electromagnetic fault injection. The economics of such attacks have also shifted dramatically—where once only nation-state actors could afford the necessary equipment, today's hardware hacking tools are increasingly accessible and affordable. This democratization of attack capabilities means that even modestly funded adversaries can now attempt firmware extraction from protected microcontrollers. The lesson for embedded system designers is clear: read-out protection should be considered a deterrent rather than an absolute barrier, and defense-in-depth strategies must be employed to protect sensitive intellectual property and cryptographic material stored within MCU firmware.